Collisions at sea happen for one reason and one reason only.
It was a clear night as the 205-foot yacht cruised from Albany to Bimini, but the bumpy seas were kicking up spray that made it difficult to see out of the severely aft-sloping bridge windows. The captain and bosun were on watch together as the yacht made her way at 20 knots. At 9:48pm the captain left to check on the guests. Just before 10pm the bosun, still alone on the bridge, turned his back to the windows as he recorded the hourly log entries and navigation fix. Less than a minute after 10pm, the yacht crashed into the transom of a 160-foot tanker which was underway at five knots. The impact at a relative speed of 15 knots penetrated the tanker’s aft ballast tank and engine room, causing flooding that ultimately sank the vessel. Fortunately, all seven crew members were plucked from their life raft by another yacht that responded to the distress call.
This worst-case scenario took place in December 2021 involving the yacht Utopia IV and the tanker Tropic Breeze. It is by no means an isolated incident. Collisions at sea happen more often than one might expect, considering the vastness of the ocean. Or perhaps it is such immensity that invites complacency. In every instance, the common factor is that neither vessel’s crew saw the other, by sight or on radar.
For example, in another collision involving a private yacht, off the coast of San Diego in 2018, a small passenger vessel carrying overnight fishing guests ran into a 332-foot superyacht, resulting in one casualty. Each vessel had only one crew member on the bridge at the time, and both operators claimed their radars never identified the other vessel prior to the accident.
The ensuing investigations come to similar conclusions, as in our worst-case scenario. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the probable cause to be: “Utopia IV’s wheelhouse crew not maintaining a proper lookout and therefore not identifying the tank vessel they were overtaking. Contributing was the Tropic Breeze’s bridge team also not maintaining a proper lookout.”
In addition to the watch crew not actively scanning the horizon, the NTSB report highlights how neither crew used their radar effectively. Each vessel had their radar set to a three-mile scale. As the yacht closed in on the tanker at a relative 15 knots, it would have taken 12 minutes to cover three miles, which means, “it is likely none of them looked at the radar in the 12 minutes before the collision,” says the report.
The consequences of not paying attention can be dire. In March, there was a fiery collision in the North Sea between a container ship and a tanker carrying jet fuel. One crew member was lost, and the container ship captain was charged with gross negligence manslaughter. And in February, the master of a container ship was sentenced to eight months in jail for failing to operate a ship in accordance with ISM. His second officer was alone on the bridge with nav alarms turned off, chatting online on his tablet when they hit a barge. Two crew members died.
The rules are clear, well-known and well understood: Rule 5 of the COLREGs says vessels must maintain a proper lookout “using sight and hearing as well as all available means…” Today’s yacht bridges have plenty to offer when it comes to “all available means,” being more sophisticated than ever. On the new-build Santosha, five screens can switch between the three ECDIS units, two radars, cameras and conning displays. But what about good old-fashioned “sight and hearing”?
“That’s something I always teach my deckhands. The idea is we always have one lookout in here so myself or the captain can concentrate on [the electronics] and the lookout is always looking out the windows. It’s super important,” says Santosha’s chief officer, Dave Murphy.
Captain Antonio Gerini of Book Ends runs watches the same way, with a second watch stander always looking. They are only sent on rounds when the yacht is in open sea far from any traffic, he says.
Antonio took delivery of Utopia IV and was asked back to oversee the repairs after the accident. As a former naval officer with more than 30 years at sea, he sees a gap in experience with younger yacht captains that leads to these kinds of accidents.
“The new generation is not using the binoculars or their eyes as much. During this collision, the tanker had no AIS;
there are also amateurs at sea without it, and for that reason I think our eyes are the best solution. Tracking by radar or electronic charts, sometimes there can be mistakes. The older generation, like me, they know,” he says.
“It can happen to anyone; if you have just one minute of not looking, you can hit something in the water.”